Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1972

In Re: George H. Badger : Respondent's Brief

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2

Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.Glenn C. Hanni; Attorney for Respondent
Recommended Citation
Petition for Rehearing, Bigler v. Badger, No. 12052 (1972).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/5248

This Petition for Rehearing is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN 1HE SUPREME COUll'f .,:
.;
OF TiiE
· .··,, · ,,;,i!,'
11

STATE OF UTAH{\>
.

-

.

-----·-,

.,.1:

IN RE:
GEORGE H. BADGER, ...,_ ,.
DiBt:ir".'iM
.
'I'"
7"/I
:····

WAYNE
'Kearns H. WADS.WORTH
Salt La.ke City, Ut.ab
FRANK GUSTIN
Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Ut.ab
Pf'osecutifl,f/

F.
1

.... '. i
"·u·
,

· 1 ·>:

. n )>,. ·'

AU.G r4 ·
,
C<nn,mi.ttee --c;;.{··s;;;:._c...t;

..

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ----------------------------------------

1

ARGUMENT ------------------------------------------------------------------------

1

POINT I.
IN REVIEWING THE FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATION OF THE B A R
COMMISSION THIS COURT APPLIED
AN ERRONEOUS STANDARD--------------------------

1

POINT II.
DISBARMENT OF GEORGE H. BADGER
IS MUCH TOO HARSH WHEN COMPARED WITH THE DISCIPLINARY ACTION
TAKEN BY THIS COURT IN OTHER
CASES ------------------------------------------------------------------------

4

CONCLUSION ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 22

CASES CITED
Egan v. State Bar of California, 294 P.2d 949 ---------------- 21

l
r

i
l'

Ex-Parte Bennett, 269 P.2d 490 ---------------------------------------- 21
Ex-Parte Powell, 269 P.2d 512 (Ore.) ---------------------------- 21
In re Badger, 27 Utah 2d 174, 493 P.2d 1273 ------------------ 2
In re Baldwin, 303 P.2d 943 (Ore.) ---------------------------------- 21
In re Barclay, 82 Utah 288, 24 P.2d 302 (1933) -------------- 13
In re Bridwell, 25 Utah 2d 1,
47 4 P.2d 116 ( 1970) __________________________________________ 3, 10, 23
In re Burton, 67 Utah 118, 246 P. 188 (1926) ________________

9

In re Carroll, 343 P.2d 1023 (Wash.) ----------------------------- 21
In re Dennett, 18 Utah 2d 127, 417 P.2d 245 ------------------ 6
In re Evans, 22 Utah 366, 62 P. 913 (1900),
reversed, 42 Utah 282, 130 P.217 ( 1913) ________________ 8, 11
In re Foxley, 61 Utah 575, 217 P.248 (1923) ------------------ 5
In re Fritts, 341 P.2d 555 (Ore.) -------------------------------------- 21

TABLE OF CONTENTS Continued
Page
In re Fullmer, 17 Utah 2d 121, 405 P.2d 343 ( 1965) ________ 16
In re Graham, 118 P.2d 1093 (Ariz.) -------------------------------- 21
In re Hanson, 48 Utah 163, 158 P. 778 (1916) ______________ 9, 11
In re Hannon, 324 P.2d 753 (Ore.) --------------------------------- 21
In re Hatch, 108 Utah 446 ,160 P.2d 961 (1945) ______________ 17
In re Hilton, 48 Utah 172, 158 P. 691 (1916) __________________ 5, 21
In re Jones, 68 Utah 213, 249 P. 803 (1926) ____________________ 10
In re King, 7 Utah 2d 258, 322 P.2d 1095 (1958) ____________ 16

In re King, 257 P.2d 219 (Wash.) -------------------------------------- 21
In re Marsh, 42 Utah 186, 129 P. 411 (1913) ____________________ 4
In re Matthews, 61 Utah 581, 217 P. 250 (1923) ____________

6

In re Mac Farlane, 10 Utah 2d 217,
350 P.2d 631 (1960) ---------------------------------------------------- 16
In re McCullough, 97 Utah 533, 95 P.2d 13 (1939) __________ 14

In re Norton, 106 Utah 179, 146 P.2d 899 (1944) ____________ 15
In re Park, 274 P.2d 1006 (Wash.) ------------------------------------ 21
In re Pearce, 103 Utah 522, 136 P.2d 969 (1943) ____________ 6
In re Platz, 42 Utah 439, 132 P. 390 (1913) ___________________ 4
In re Richeson, 166 P.2d 583 (Ariz.) -------------------------------- 21
In re Snow, 27 Utah 265, 75 P. 741 (1904) ____________________ 8, 13

In re Steffensen, 85 Utah 380, 39 P.2d 722 (1935) ______ 14, 15
In re Steffensen, 94 Utah 436, 78 P.2d 531 (1938) ---------In re Wade, ________ Utah 2d ________ , ________ P.2d
________ , No. 12780 (1972) ---------------------------------------------Narlian v. State Bar of California, 136 P.2d 553 ____________
People v. Ki.stler, 354 P.2d 1022 (Colo.) ---------------------------Sturr v. State Bar of California, 338 P.2d 897 ------------------

15
18
21
21
21

TEXTS CITED
Utah Constitution, Article VIII, Sec. 2 ---------------------------- 22

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
IN RE:
GEORGE H. BADGER,
Disciplinary Proceeding

Case No.
\
12052

APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING
AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
George H.
respectfully petitions the court for i(venearing iiythe above-entitled
matter, or in the hl_tg_i:!!atiye_ that the court modify
its decision by vacating the disbarment judgment
and imposing in lieu thereof a suspension for a reasonable period of time. Considering the violations involved, disbarment is much too harsh. The interests
of the public and of the bar will be best served by a
period of suspension.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
IN REVIEWING THE FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE BAR COMMISSION
THIS COURT APPLIED AN ERRONEOUS
STANDARD.

Although a reading of the record, examination
1

of the exhibits and of the testimony, would justify a
conclusion contrary to that reached by the Disciplinary Committee, no effort will be made to review the
evidence or to argue that the Findings of Fact are
not supported by the evidence. The sole purpose of
this petition is to request that the court ( 1) apply
the correct standard of review, and (2) re-examine
the harsh and final judgment or disbarment in light
of the prior decisions of this court and the facts and
circumstances of this case.
This court in In re Badger, 27 Utah 2d 174, 493
P.2d 1273, in reviewing the Bar Commission's recommendations stated:
"The Bar Commission has recommended
that Mr. Badger's conduct justifies disbarment; such a recommendation, in the final analysis constitutes a value judgment, which may
be accepted, modified or rejected by this court.
However, this coiirt has established a standard
that it will sitstain the recommendation of the
Bar Commission unless it has acted arbitrarily, capricioitsly or unreasonably. If the alleged
severity of the recommendation be evaluated
by this standard, there is no ground upon
which this coilrt can predicate a departure
from it." (emphasis added)
We have no quarrel with the court applying the
standard referred to when reviewing the findings of
the Bar Commission. In view of this court's pronouncements in prior decisions, we do not believe this
standard should be followed when reviewing the Bar
Commission's recommendations of punishment as dis2

tinguished from its findings. Findngs of Fact on the
one hand and recommendations for punishment on
the other are not in the same category and different
standards of review have always, prior to the instant
case, been applied by the Supreme Court.
This court in the case of In re Bridwell, 25 Utah
2d 1, 474 P.2d 116 (1970) stated the standards of
review as follows:
"It has been the policy of this court to look
upon the findings and recommendations of
the Utah State Bar with indulgence; and while
we are still of the opinion that the findings of
the Utah State Bar should be adopted by this
court unless they appear to be arbitrary or not
in accord with the preponderance of the evidence, yet we do not consider the recommendations of punishment made by the bar w be in
the same category as we do their findings of
fact, because it is our responsibiilty to discipline an erring attorney, and we cannot delegate that duty to others. The Utah State Bar
makes its recommendations upon a reading of
the printed record of proceedings had before
committees and not before the individual commissioners of the State Bar. We are, therefore,
in an equally good position to evaluate the situation as are the commissioners." Id. at 116.

Had the court applied the review standard it
employed in Bridwell and all of its prior disciplinary
decisions, we do not believe it would have agreed with
the harsh and unyielding recommendation of the Bar
Commission. Fairness would seem to dictate that a
lawyer when being proceeded against in a disciplin3

ary matter, has a right to have the recommendations
of the Bar Commission reviewed by the correct standard as enunciated in Bridwell. A rehearing would
accomplish this.
POINT II
DISBARMENT OF GEORGE H. BADGER IS
MUCH TOO HARSH WHEN COMPARED WITH
THE DISCIPLINARY ACTION TAKEN BY
THIS COURT IN OTHER CASES.

We have made a diligent effort to find all of the
reported disciplinary cases decided by this court in
its entire history. In only seven reported cases so far
as we have been able to determine has the harsh, final
and unyielding penalty of disbarment been imposed.
A short resume of those cases follows:

IN RE MARSH, 42 Utah 186, 129 P. 411
( 1913).
1. Wrongs Committed: Kept a house of prostitution "at which white girls consorted
with negros and smoked opium with his
knowledge, and to which he took beer and
served to inmates and patrons."
2. Grievance Committee's Recommendation:
Complete disbarment.
3. Penalty Imposed by Supreme Court: Found
morally unfit to be a member of the bar
and permanently disbarred.
IN RE PLATZ, 42Utah439,132 P. 390 (1913).
1. Wrongs Committed: No facts are stated in
the court's opinion. A check was made in
the Clerk's office and in the archives to see
4

if a detailed statement of facts could be
obtained but these efforts were without
success. From the opinion of the court it
would appear that there were several very
serious violations in terms of moral conduct, dishonesty, and deception.
2. Grievance Committee's Recommendation:
Permanent disbarment.
3. Penalty Imposed by Supreme Court: Found
unfit to be a member of the bar and permanently disbarred.
IN RE HILTON, 48 Utah 172, 158 P. 691
(1916).
1. Wrongs Committed: Attacked the Utah
Supreme Court for a decision regarding an
executed murderer. Attacked the court
"wilfully and maliciously in the press, public addresses, and otherwise," to the effect
that the the court was improperly influenced, prejudiced, and unfair.
2. Grievance Committee's Recommendation:
Permanent disbarment.
3. Penalty Imposed by Supreme Court: Permanently disbarred on the grounds that an
attorney who intentionally misrepresents
matters with respect to the court and who
deliberately attempts to bring it into disrespect is guilty of moral turpitude.
IN RE FOXLEY, 61 Utah 575, 217 P. 248
(1923).
1. Wrong Committed: Convicted of embezzlement.
2. Penalty Imposed by Supreme Court: Dis5

barred and name stricken from the record
as provided by statute, (Sec. 331 Compiled
Laws of Utah 1917).
IN RE MATTHEWS, 61 Utah 581, 217 P. 250
(1923).
1. Wrongs Committed: Took $3,500.00 from
client to pay alimony in divorce proceeding
with agreement that unused money would
be repaid. Divorce proceeding was dropped,
Matthews returned only $1,000.00 and kept
the balance converting it to his own use.
Matthews fled the state to escape prosecution and punishment.
2. Grievance Committee's RecommendatWn:
Disbarment.
3. Penalty Imposed by Supreme Court: Disbarred and name stricken from the record.
IN RE PEARCE, 103 Utah 522, 136 P. 2d 969
(1943).
1. Wrongs Committed: Convicted of criminal
conspiracy to '"permit, allow, assist and enable houses of ill fame and gambling houses
to be kept, maintained and operated in Salt
Lake City, knowing such operation to be in
violation of the law." Did so and collected
money from the operators of such places.
2. Board of Commissioners Recommendatwn:
Disbarment.
3. Penalty Imposed by Supreme Court: Permanently disbarred as required by statute,
(Sec. 6-0-36 U.C.A. 1943)
IN RE DENNETT, 18 Utah 2d, 127, 417 P.2d
245.
6

This is a reported case where the attorney
was disbarred. None of the facts involving the
wrongful conduct of the lawyer are stated in
the opinion. Because of this in our discussion,
we are not taking this case into consideration.
It should be noted that of the seven cases, two of
them involved criminal convictions where disbarment
is provided for by statute and in one case, Pearce,
was mandatory.
Hilton involved an aggravated, wilful and re-

peated assault on the Supreme Court and a deliberate
attempt to bring it into disrepute. Matthews involved
conduct that would amount to embezzlement. It
should be noted that inasmuch as two of the instances
of disbarment were after conviction of a criminal
offense this court in its entire history, so far as we
are able to determine, has disbarred a lawyer in regular disciplinary proceedings on four occasions only.
One of those occasions amounted to an embezzlement,
another a deliberate and wilful disrespectful attack
on the Supreme Court amounting to moral turpitude. The other two, Marsh and P"latz, involved serious violations in terms of moral conduct, dishonesty
and deception.
The case now before this court involves ( 1) a
finding of solicitation, and (2) a finding of common
law fraud in a civil action, not involving a client however, and which finding of fraud was expunged from
the court record by the judge who made the original
finding. A reading of the cases where disbarment has
7

been ordered readily demonstrates the conduct involved in those cases was much more aggravated and
serious than the violations of which George H. Badger
has been found guilty.
We have made an exhaustive review of the Utah
Supreme Court's decisions where disbarment was recommended by the Bar Commission but where this
court independently re-evaluated the conduct of the
attorney and determined that the Bar Commission's
recommendation was simply too severe. The following cases fall in this category:
DISBARMENT RECOMMENDED.
COURT REFUSED.

SUPREME

IN RE EVANS, 22 Utah 366, 62 P. 913 ( 1900),
reversed 42 Utah 282, 130 P. 217 (1913).
1. Wrongs Committed: Stipulated in a con-

tract with a client that the attorney would
pay the cost of litigation. Furthermore,
acted against the interest of his clients and
disregarded the confidential nature of the
attorney-client relationship.
2. Grievance Committee's Recommendation:
Permanent disbarment.
3. Penalty Imposed by Supreme Court: Required repayment of the clients. No other
punishment upon satisfaction of this requirement.

IN RE SNOW, 27 Utah 265, 75 P. 741 (1904).
1. Wrongs Committed: In an answer filed in
an action, made "scandalous and malicious
8

false allegations against judge on the Utah
Supreme Court charging that he bartered
his judicial influence for a portion of the
fruits of litigation in a conspiracy to falsely maintain an action."
2. Grievance Committee's Recommendation:
Disbarment.
3. Penalty Imposed by Supreme Court: Suspended for sixty days.

IN RE HANSON, 48 Utah 163, 158 P. 778
(1916).
1. Wrongs Committed: Went into policie station where Chief of Police was holding
client's clothes to be used as evidence and
took the clothes away to avoid detection by
police.
2. Grievance Committee's Recommendation:
Permanent disbarment.
3. Penalty Imposed by Supreme Court: Suspended for sixty days.
IN RE BURTON, 67 Utah 118, 246 P. 188
(1926).
1. Wrongs Committed: (Involved a judge not
an attorney) Wrote a letter to himself purporting to have been written by a party in
litigation in his court, then attempted to
get party to sign it. Also, arbitrarily suspended attorneys from practicing in his
court.
2. Grievance Committee's Recommendation:
Disbarment.
3. Penalty Imposed by Supreme Court: Court
9

decided that he could not practice while he
was a judge anyway, so disbarment or suspension may be useless. Received only a
formal reprimand.
IN RE JONES, 68 Utah213, 249 P. 803 (1926).
1. Wrongs Committed: Appeared without
authority as attorney for several parties in
a proceeding. Also changed name of grantee after execution of a deed in order to defraud his own creditors (and succeeded).
2. Grievance Committee's Recommendation:
Disbarment.
3. Penalty Imposed by Supreme Court: None.
Held not sufficiently serious to justify disbarment or suspension.
IN RE BRIDWELL, 25 Utah 2d 1, 474P.2d116
(1970).
1. Wrongs Committed: Represented clients
with conflicting interests resulting in one
client getting a $10,000.00 profit at the expense of the other client. There were several other 'wrongs" which were subject to
disagreement.
2. Board of Commissioner's Recommendation: Total disbarment.
3. Penalty Imposed by the Supreme Court:
Suspension for one year.
Just as most courts are loathe even in cases involving the most heinous of crime to impose the death
penalty, so the Utah Supreme Court has been most
reluctant, except in highly aggravated cases, to impose the Supreme Penalty in a disciplinary matter 10

DISBARMENT. A reading of the opinion in Bridwell
demonstrates that the conduct there involved was
more aggravated than in the case at bar, yet this court
refused to follow the recommended disbarment and
in lieu of that suspended the lawyer for one year.
In voicing its reluctance and refusal to follow
the Bar Committee's recommendation of permanent
disbarment, the court in In re Evans, 22 Utah 366, 62
P. 913 (1900), said:
"Admission as an attorney is not obtained
without years of labor and study. The office
which the party thus acquires is one of value,
and often becomes the source of great honor
and emolument to its possessor. To most persons who enter the profession, it is the means
of support to themselves and their families. To
deprive one of the office of this character
would often be to decree poverty to himself and
destitution to his family. A removal from the
bar should, therefore, never be decreed where
any punishment less severe, such as reprimand, temporary suspension, or fine, would
accomplish the end desired."
The mere fact that George Badger had left the
practice temporarily to engage in business undertakings should not alter the application of the principle
enunciated in Evans in this case.
This court in In re Hanson, 48 Utah 163, 158
P. 778 (1916), again voiced its opposition and refusal to follow the Bar Committee's recommendation
that the drastic punishment of disbarment be imposed when it said:
11

"The conduct on his part was wholly unnecessary, and it cannot be overlooked nor minimired by this court. To do that would be a
reproach to the law, as well as to this court, and
be a reflection upon the character and high
standing of the bar in this state. The defendant's conduct, though reprehensible, yet hardly
calls for the drastic remedy of disbarment. To
disbar him would, in our judgment be quite as
unjust to him as to entirely absolve him from
all blame, as he asks to be, would be unfair and
unjust to all the other members of the bar of
this court, as well as to the court itself. We are
convinced that the defendant deserves to be,
and should be, admonished that conduct such
as he was guilty of is reprehensible to the last
degree, and cannot be indulged by any attorney
with impunity, and will not be tolerated by this
court.
"In view, therefore, that these proceedings are not intended as punishment in the
sense that a sentence or judgment in a criminal
proceeding is deemed to be so, but are intended
more in the nature of an admonition to the accused and to protect the public against future
transgressions upon the part of the attorney,
the only question is what, in justice and fairness to all, should our judgment be." Id. a:t 780.
As noted by the court, disciplinary proceedings are
not intended as punishment but are intended more
in the nature of an admonition to the accused and to
protect the public against future transgressions upon
the part of the attorney. We submit that to disbar
Badger in this case is akin to imposing the death sentence, is penal in nature, and is much more severe
12

than is necessary "to protect the public against fivture transgressions upon the part of the attorney."
A suspension for a reasonable period of time will
more than adequately accomplish the purpose of these
proceedings.
This court again in the case of In re Snow, 27
Utah 265, 75 P. 741 (1904), reaffirmed its position
against decreeing disbarment notwithstanding the recommendation of the Bar Committee. In so doing,
the court said :
"The offense of Snow is indeed of such
gravity that we would be entirely within the
law if we should proceed to inflict the severest
penalty and permanently disbar him. The power of inflicting such punishment shouUl never
be exercised unless absolutely necessary to
protect the court and the public from one shown
to be unfit to be a member of an honorable profession." Id. at 746. (emphasis added)
SUSPENSION RECOMMENDED. S UP R E M E
COURT REDUCED TIME OF SUSPENSION.
In other cases the Bar Commission has recommended suspension of an attorney for a certain period of time and the Supreme Court in reviewing this
recommendation has disagreed with the Bar Commission and has suspended the attorney for a lesser
period than that recommended. The following are
cases in this category:

IN RE BARCLAY, 82 Utah 288, 24 P.2d 302
(1933).
1. Wrongs Committed: "Wilful disobedience
in violation of an order of the court" and
13

appropriating a client's money to his own
use.
2. Board of Commissioner's Recommendation: Suspension for six months.
3. Penalty Imposed by Supreme Court: Suspended for three months.
IN RE McCULLOUGH, 97 Utah 533, 95 P.2d
13 (1939).
1. Wrongs Committed: (a) Solicitation of
employment in personal injury cases (both
directly and through others) ; ( b) Refused
to disclose to the court the whereabouts of
an accused person released to his custody;
( c) Gave false testimony under oath in contempt proceedings.
2. Board of Commissioner's Recommendations: Two years suspension and until he
could satisfy the Bar "that he is a fit and
proper person, both morally and in the
knowledge of the law, to be reinstated."
3. Penalty Imposed by Supreme Court: Suspended for nine months, (and specifically
held that the additional conditions set out
in quotes above were ''not justified.")
IN RE STEFFENSEN, 85 Utah 380, 39 P.2d
722 (1935).
1. Wrongs Committed: Failed to pay over to
a client money collected on behalf of the
client.
2. Board of Commissioner's Recommendations: Three months suspension.
3. Penalty Imposed by Supreme Court: Suspended for three months.
14

IN RE STEFFENSEN, 94 Utah 436, 78 P.2d
531 (1938).
1. Wrongs Committed: Again failed to pay
over money to a client collected in settlement of an action.
2. Board of Commissioner's Recommendations: (The specific recommendation of the
Board of Commisioners was not explicitly
set out by the court. However, the court did
note that the punishment it imposed was
less than that recommended by the Board
of Commissioners.)
3. Penalty Imposed by Supreme Court: Suspended for six months.
This court on other occasions has dealt with
breaches of professional conduct much more serious
or at least as serious as the conduct involved in this
case and in each occasion has not imposed the Supreme Penalty - DISBARMENT, but on the other
hand has felt that a suspension or other mode of
punishment would best serve as an admonition to the
offender and as protection to the public against further transgressions.
IN RE NORTON, 106 Utah 179, 146 P.2d 899
( 1944).
1. Wrongs Committed: Intentionally represented to the Utah Supreme Court that an
exhibit which had been offered as evidence
and was refused had been admitted into
evidence, knowing it had not been received
in to evidence.
2. Bar Commission's Recommendation: One
year suspension.
15

3. Penalty Imposed by Supreme Court: One
year suspension.
IN RE KING, 7 Utah 2d 258, 322 P.2d 1095
(1958).
1. Wrongs Committed: Failed to discwse
known perjury of a witness until its falsity
was shown by opposing counsel.
2. Bar Commission's Recommendation:
3. Penalty Imposed by Supreme Court: Suspension for six months and until recommended for reinstatement.
IN RE MACFARLANE, 10 Utah 2d 217, 350
P.2d 631 ( 1960).
1. Wrongs Committed: Exercised fraud and
undue influence upon client, particularly
in drafting will to become beneficiary of
one-third of a $285,000.00 estate.
2. Bar Commission's Recommendation: One
year suspension.
3. Penalty Imposed by Supreme Court: Suspended for one year and until application
for and recommended for reinstatement.
IN RE FULLMER, 17 Utah 2d 121,405 P.2d
343 (1965).
1. Wrongs Committed: Received $2,500.00 for
personal injury settlement. Falsely represented to clients that an action had been
filed on their claim and that trial had been
set for a later date. Meanwhile he received
the money, by a deceptive artifice procured
client's signatures on a release and draft,
and converted the money to his own use. On
16

a second count Fullmer converted $780.00
of a client's money.
2. Bar Commission's Recommendation: Three
years suspension.
3. Penalty Imposed by Supreme Court: Three
years suspension. The court noted that the
conduct of the lawyer was such that charges
of "embezzlement" might very well lie.
IN RE HATCH, 108 Utah 446, 160 P.2d 961
(1945).
1. Wrongs Committed: Collected fee in excess
of that set by Industrial Commission and
kept money for nearly four years which
was collected from client to be paid to client's former wife in satisfaction of former
judgment and stipulation.
2. Board of Commissioner's Recommendation: Suspension for one year.
3. Penalty Imposed by Supreme Court: Suspension for one year.
It seems grossly unfair that Badger should be
disbarred for solicitation and a finding of fraud in
a civil action which was later expunged from the
court record by the judge, when:

( 1) As in Norton, a lawyer intentionally misCourt and received a one year
led the
suspens10n.
(2) A lawyer, as in King, knowingly used
perjured testimony of a witness and was given
a six month suspension.
(3) The attorney, as in MacFarlane, was
guilty of fraud and undue influence in dealing
17

with an elderly client and by virtue of which
succeeds in being named as a beneficiary of a
large estate and receives a suspension of one
year.
( 4) The attorney, as in Barclay, wilfully violates a court order, converts his client's money
t? his own use and gets a three month suspens10n.
(5) As in McCullough, the attorney is guilty
of soliciation, refusal to disclose to the court
the whereabouts of an accused person released
to his custody, gives perjured testimony under
oath in contempt proceedings and is given a
nine month suspension.
(6) The lawyer, as in Bridwell, was guilty
of the many wrongs spelled out in the opinion,
all of which conduct was more grave than the
charges of which Badger was found giulty, and
receives a one year suspension.
(7) The lawyer, as in Fullmer, is guilty of
fraud and deception practiced on his client and
embezzlement of his client's money and receives a three year suspension.
Since the decision in Badger, this court dealt
with another disciplinary problem in the case of In re
Wade, ________ Utah 2d ________ , ________ P.2d ________ No. 12780
( 1972). In that case the lawyer neglected to attend
to his client's affairs which were entrusted 'to his care
and attention and failed to maintain complete records
of client's funds, securities and properties which
were entrusted to him, and he failed to account 'to his
client for these. The penalty imposed by the Supreme
Court was two years suspension. The conduct of the
18

lawyer in Wade is manifestly as bad or worse than
that of the attorney in Badger, yet Wade gets a two
year suspension and Badger gets disbarred. This
seems grossly unfair. Had the court reviewed the
punishment for itself and made its own determination as to what would be proper and fair, rather than
simply looking at it from the standpoint of whether
the Bar Commission had acted arbitrarily and capriciously, we submit the result in Badger would have
been about the same as in Wade.
The cases cited in this brief thus far, we believe
are substantially all of the reported disciplinary cases
that have been before the Utah Supreme Court to the
present time. The cases fall into four categories:
( 1) Where the Bar Committee's recommendation was disbarment and the Supreme
Court adopted this recommendation. As
discussed above, it should be noted there
are only seven cases in this category, two of
which involve conviction of crime and disbarment under the statute. The other four
cases considered involve intentional and
aggravated conduct on the part of the attorney.
( 2) Where the Bar Commission recommended
disbarment and the Supreme Court refused to follow this recommendation but
on the contrary decreed the less harsh but
equally effective penalty of suspension or
reprimand. An examination of these cases
demonstrates clearly that in many of
them the conduct on the part of the lawyer
was much more aggravated than the conduct involved in this case and in spit.e of
19

this the court was of the opinion that the
interest of the public and of the bar would
be best served by a suspension or reprimand rather than the drastic remedy of
disbarment.
(3) Where the Bar Commission recommended a suspension and the Supreme Court in
making its own determination as to what
would be fair, imposes suspension but for
a lesser period than recommended.
( 4) Where the Bar Commission recommened
a one to three year suspension and the Supreme Court adopted the recommendation.
In this category of cases we have Norton
(attorney intentionally misleading the
Supreme Court) one year suspension;
King (attorney knowingly using perjured testimony) six months suspension and
until recommended for reinstatement;
MacFarlane (attorney guilty of fraud
and undue influence which resulted in
elderly client naming attorney as beneficiary under her will) one year suspension and until recommended for reinstatement; Fullmer (attorney converts proceeds of personal injury settlement 'to his
own use and deceives client who cannot
speak or understand English language
very well into signing release and endorsii:ig settlement draft) three years suspens10n.
We submit the conduct of the lawyers involved in this fourth category was of a
more serious nature or at least equally as
serious as the conduct with which George
20

Badger was adjudged guilty, and yet in
each instance this court felt justice was
best served by resorting to the less harsh
remedy of suspension rather than decreeing the ultimate penalty - DISBARMENT.
Generally speaking, this court as well as courts of
other states has resorted to the extreme remedy of
disbarment only on rare occasions and only then when
the conduct of the lawyer involved ( 1) conviction of
a felony or other crime involving "moral turpitude"
(See: In re Fritts, 341 P.2d 555 (Ore.); Ex-Parte
Powell, 269 P.2d 512 (Ore.) ; In re Baldwin, 303 P.2d
943 ( Ore.) ; In re King, 257 P.2d 219 (Wash.) ; ExParte Bennett, 269 P.2d 490, and (2) habitual misuse
of or conversion of client's funds to attorney's own
use (See: Narlian v. State Bar of California, 136 P.2d
553; Egan v. State Bar of California, 294 P.2d 949;
Sturr v. State Bar of California, 338 P.2d 897; People
v. Kistler, 354 P.2d 1022 (Col.); In re Graham, 118
P.2d 1093 (Ariz.); In re Hannon, 324 P.2d 753
(Ore.); In re Park, 274 P.2d 1006 (Wash.); In re
Carroll, 343 P.2d 1023 (Wash.), and (3) where the
conduct of the attorney has been intentionally malicious and groundless and calculated to bring the judge
or court into disrepute (See: In re Richeson, 166 P.2d
583 (Ariz.), In re Hilton, 48 Utah 172, 158 P. 691).
It will serve little purpose to cite additional cases
from other jurisdictions. We believe that a comparison of the action of this court in prior disciplinary
matters and subsequent (In re Wade, supra) with the
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punishment imposed in this case should be persuasive
that the court ought to reconsider its actions in this
case.
CONCLUSION
A rehearing should be granted or in the alternative the judgment of disbarment should be vacated and a judgment of suspension (in this event considering prior cases, six months to two years) entered
for the following reasons:
1. In this case only four of the justices participated in the decision. The dissenting opinion expressed doubt as to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the Bar Commission's findings of fact but conceding there was a basis for supporting them, that
the penalty of disbarment was much too severe and
recommended one year suspension. Article VIII, Section 2, Utah Consitution provides as follows:
"The Supreme Court shall consist of five
judges, which number may be increased or decreased by the Legislature, but no alteration or
increase shall have the effect of removing a
judge from office. A majority of the judges
constituting the court shall be necessary to
form a quorum or render a decision. If a J ustice of the Supreme Court shall be disqualified
from sitting in a cause before said court, the
remaining judges shall call a district judge to
sit with them on the hearing of such cause.***"
While we appreciate that none of the Justices were
"disqualified," nevertheless Mr. Justice Henroid, for
reasons of his own did not "participate" in the de22

cision. In a case involving capital punishment, which
disbarment to a lawyer approaches, if such an extreme remedy is to be resorted to, it should be only
after full consideration by the full court participat-

ing.

2. A different standard of review of the Bar
Commission's recommendation as to remedy was applied in this case than has been applied by this court
in all prior disciplinary proceedings that have come
before it. The question to be determined is not whether "the Bar Commission acted arbitrarily, capriciously or unreasonably" in recommending disbarment as
stated by the court in Badger, but what this court, reviewing the findings of fact of the Bar Commission,
the evidence in the record and evaluating the situation itself independent of the Bar Commission's recommendations (though taking it into consideration)
believes the discipline of the attorney should be. The
standard of review applied by this court in Bridwell
and in all of its prior decisions is substantially different than the standard applied by this court in the instant case. In Bridwell this court said:
"***While we are still of the opinion that
the findings of the Utah State Bar should be
adopted by this court unless they appear to be
arbitrary or not in accord with the preponderance of the evidence, yet we do not consider the
recommendations of punishment made by the
bar to be in the same category as we do their
findings of fact, because it is our responsibility
to discipline an erring attorney, and we cannot delegate that duty to others. The Utah
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State Bar makes its recommendations upon a
reading of the printed record of proceedings
had before committees and not before the individual commissioners of the State Bar. We are,
therefore, in an equally good position to evaluate the situation as are the commissioners."
This standard is significantly different than the
standard applied in Badger where the court stated:
"The Bar Commission has recommended
that Mr. Badger's conduct justifies disbarment; such a recommendation, in the final analysis constitutes a value judgment, which may
be accepted, modified, or rejected by this court.
However, th'is court has establ'ished a standard
that it will sustain the recommendation of the
Bar Comm'ission unless it has acted arbitrarily,
capriciously or unreasonably. (emphasis added) If the alleged severity of the recommendation be evaluated by this standard, there is
no ground upon which this court can predicate
a departure from it."
We sincerely believe that if the court had been independently evaluating the disciplinary action that
should be taken and determining for itself what it
thought it should be under all of the circumstances,
rather than determining whether the Bar Commission had acted "arbitrarily, capriciously or unreasonably," that very likely a different result would
have been reached.
3. A comparison of the drastic disciplinary action taken in this case with the action taken in all of
the prior disciplinary proceedings to come before this
court demonstrates, we think rather clearly, that
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Badger has been much more severely dealt with than
has any other erring member of the legal profession.
This of itself should justify this court in granting a
rehearing where the fairness of the disciplinary action to be taken can be fully argued before a full court,
or should prompt this court to vacate its judgment of
disbarment and the entry of a decree less harsh and
more in line with the disciplinary punishment meted
in the past.
Respectfully submitted,
GLENN C. HANNI
STRONG & HANNI
604 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for
George H. Badger
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